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RECENT CASES
the North Dakota Supreme Court has sustained convictions of sec-
ond degree manslaughter where a driver's recklessness caused the
death of another.14 These situations are therefore already provided
for. It seems that if the statute is to be of material significance in
improving the safety of the North Dakota highways, it will be
applicable to situations such as those in the instant case.15
MERVIN A. TUNTLAND.
CORPORATIONS - ACQUISITION OF MEMBERSHIP - CO-OPERATIVE
PATRON'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP DENIED. - The Cherry-
Todd Electric Co-operative, Inc., a non-profit, non-stock, corpora-
tion was converted to a co-operative under statute. The creating
statute provided that patrons of the electric co-operative were not
required to become members but such patrons should have the
right to become members upon such terms as may be prescribed in
the by-laws. The by-laws provided, inter-alia, that membership
could orly be attained by acceptance for membership by the Board
of Directors or members. A special meeting was held to vote on a
proposed change of the principal place of business. Plaintiff's ap-
plication for membership and right to vote at this meeting were
denied. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that the co-operative acting through its Board of Di-
rectors or its members does not possess the right to deny an appli-
cant's membership. Meyers v. Lux, 75 N.W.2d 533 (S. D. 1956).
Corporations may prescribe through by-laws the qualifications
necessary for membership and the procedure by which membership
may be acquired.' In the absence of statutory provisions a corpo-
ration is said to have the implied or incidental power to admit
members;2 the consent of the parties is essential since the relation-
ship is contractual. 3 A non-profit corporation has the right to estab-
14. State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272 (N. D. 1955).
15. In North Dakota the only automobile accident cases of a criminal nature where
the physical or mental disability of the *drivers has been involved are cases in which the
driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135
(N. D. 1955), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that only the slightest physical or
mental disability due to the drinking of intoxicating beverage would sustain a conviction
for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If the court in so holding has
adopted a policy of construing the law so as to prevent drivers with physical disabilities
from driving automobiles and thereby jeopardizing the lives and property of others, it is
probable that a conviction of negligent homicide obtained under conditions similar to
those in the instant case would be sustained.
1. Stewart v. Monongahela Val. Country Club, 177 Pa. Super. 632, 112 A.2d 444
(1955).
2. See State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387 (1879); Ellerbe v. Faust, 119 Mo. 653, 25
S.W. 390 (1894).
3. 18 C. J. S., CORPORATIONS § 478.
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lish such classes of membership as its by-laws shall prescribe, 4 and
no one can obtain the rights of a member in a corporation except
in compliance with the governing law. 5 If that law prescribes con-
ditions or special methods for becoming a member the law is im-
perative," unless the conditions have been waived.7 Even where the
charter does not regulate or restrict the admission of new members,
it has been held that the whole matter is in the control of the cor-
poration."
A corporation, however, has no power to exclude persons from
membership in violation of its charter or enabling act, nor to enact
by-laws as to the admission or qualification of members which con-
flicts with its charter; the general laws or articles of association. 9
An enactment which is contrary to public policy, or would become
a shield for fraud will be declared invalid.10 By-laws must apply to
all persons of the class which they are intended to govern; 1 how-
ever, a by-law which discriminates between the stockholders who
deal with the company and those who do not deal with it is valid.
-12
It has been held that an applicant, was entitled to membership
upon complying with corporation rules, in- absence of substantial
grounds for his exclusion.1" Where a resort owner filed an applica-
tion to become a member of an electrical co-operative, formed to
furnish power to rural areas, it was held that he could not be
denied membership.14
It is admitted that courts can, and do, declare by-laws invalid
and ultra-vires when they are repugnant to the statutes or articles
of incorporation,' 5 or when they are unreasonable and contrary to
public policy."t By statute, in the instant case, the defendant was
permitted to prescribe additional requirements and limitations in
4. W. G. Press & Co. v. Fahy, 313 Ill. 262, 145 N.E. 103 (1924).
5. See Peninsula Leasing Co. v. Cody, 161 .Mich. 604, 126 N.W. 1053 (1910).
6. Ibid.; Mills v. Friedman, 111 Misc. 253, 181 N.Y.S, 285 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
7. Porterfield v. Blackbill & Doney Parks Water User's Ass'n., '69 Ariz. 110, 210
P.2d 335 (1949) (Incorporated to develop the community water supply. The court held
that it must admit a qualified applicant.).
8. See State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387 (1879).
9. 12A Fletcher Cyclopedia, CORPORATIONS § 5687 (1957).
10. Ibid: See Mills v. Friedman, 111 Misc. 253, 181 N.Y. S. 285 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
11. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Wutchumna Water Co., 111 Cal. 688, 296 Pac.
.933 (1931) (Rehearing Denied).
12. Mooney v. Madison Farmers' Merchantile, etc., Co., 138 Minn. 199, 164 N.W.
804 (1917) (Where a cooperative is authorized by statute to provide by by-laws for the
distribution of profits and earnings in such proportions as the stockholders deem just.).
13. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Wallace, 67 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1933)
(Certiorari- denied, 54 Sup. Ct. 529).
14. Hagans v. Excelsior Electric Membership Corporation, 207 Ga. 53, 60 S.E.2d
162 (1950).
15. Dugan v. Fireman's Pension Fund of Philadelphia, '372 Pa. 429, 94 A.2d 353
(1953) (Rehearing denied).
16. Ibid.; 12A Fletcher Cyclopedia, CORPORATIONS § 5687 (1957).
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respect to membership.17 When the by-laws set up an essential re-
quirement of membership, in accordance with the charter. or en-
abling act, applicants have no right to membership unless the by-
laws requirement has been fulfilled or has been declared invalid. 8
It is submitted' that the court in the instant case should have
reached an opposite result. A court should not compel a coropra-
tion to admit an applicant to membership against the will of those
whose consent is essential." Further, the court should not ordinar-
ily substitute its judgment for the judgment of those who are au-
thorized to adopt the corporate by-laws.2°
ARMOND G. ERICKSON.
CRIMINAL LAW- LIMITATIONS OF PROSECUTIONS- LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE. - Defendant was convicted of second degree murder
under an indictment charging him with first degree murder. The
trial court, holding that the statute of limitations applied to second
degree murder, arrested judgment before sentence. The statute
provided that "no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for
any offense not punishable with death unless the indictment there-
for shall be found within five years from the time of committing the
offense .... I On appeal the Supreme Court held, that murder was
one offense under common law, and still remains so; the statute
merely divided murder into degrees for the purpose of punish-
ment.' Therefore, the offense charged in the indictment is "punish-
able with death," and excluded from the operation of the statute.
State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956).
The New Jersey decision is contrary to the overwhelming weight
of authority which holds that one cannot be convicted of a lesser
offense includible within a larger crime, where prosecution for the
17. S. Dak. Code § 11-2209 (Supp. 1953) ("Any patron of the Co-operative
may become a member . . . the by-laws may prescribe additional qualifications and
limitations in repect to membership.").
18. Meyers v. Lux, 75 N.W.2d 533, 538 (S. D. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
19. Sorrick v. The Consolidated Tel. Co. of Springfort, 340 Mich. 463, 65 N.W.2d
713" (1954); Mills v. Friedman, 111 Misc. 253, 181 N.Y.S. 285, 294 (Sup. Ct. 1920)
(dictum).
20. See note 1 supra.
1. N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2:183-2 (1937) (Effective June 30, 1953, the period 'of
limitation was extended to *five years, L. 1953, c. 204).
2. N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2:138-2 (1937) ("Murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilfull, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpe-
trate arson, burglary, rape, robbery, or kodomy, shall be* murder in the first degree; and
all other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree; and the jury before whom
any person indicted for murder shall be tried shall, if they find such person guilty thereof,
designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second
degree.").
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